American foreign policy and intervention have always been a measure to scope how to respond to various crises and issues globally, as well as a main point of focus in the developing international system. So when asked to comment on foreign policy regarding North Korea, many researchers and experts who specialize in international affairs and responses will push for deterrence measures and not pursue engaging diplomatic conversations. They hold beliefs that there is little to no change, and we must recognize that “the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang is likely to remain a long-term fixture of the strategic environment in Northeast Asia.” In order to fully understand why this is a common policy suggestion and outlook on North Korea, it is essential first to unpack the complexities of this issue, including the political turmoil of the past and the building blocks that made North Korea what it is today.
The most prevalent conversation has been around the denuclearization of North Korea ever since they tested their first nuclear weapons on the 9th of October 2006, following their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. The motive of North Korea’s development of missiles can be traced back to its roots, starting from the Korean War (1950-53) and its aftermath. Ever since the division of the two Koreas, they have been in a nuanced relationship where they both competed and aimed for reconciliation. North Korea wanted to prove itself as a victor after an ambiguous and drawn-out war where neither side came out as the winner. North Korea, which was previously backed by the Soviet Union and China during the war, with many soldiers and resources being provided to it to have more longevity, began to lose its support. This happened as a consequence of both countries opening their relations with South Korea and as they began developing a more globalized capitalist economic system, initiating their first diplomatic relations in 1990 and 1992, respectively. North Korea was, as a consequence, left not only as a more isolationist state, but also contributed to the period of “economic collapse, famine, and widespread starvation that racked North Korea in the early and mid-1990s, a period known to North Koreans as the “Arduous March.” (Gardner et al., 2025). While North Korea was subjected to a period of vulnerability and instability, South Korea was, conversely, rapidly developing, going from being the poorest country in the world post-war to becoming one of the largest actors in Asia. As North Korea fell behind in terms of alliances and growth, it sought a way to gain leveraging power, culminating in its pursuit of nuclear power.
Because of their underlying competition and growing hostilities in the face of grand disparity, the relationship of North and South Korea, and as an extension, the US, is essential to dissect to see where the topic of denuclearization currently stands. As nuclear development continued, the longstanding U.S.-South Korea alliance evolved into a strategic counterbalance
. The U.S. backed South Korea in the Korean War and also provided copious aid to help with the consequences of the war, with $485.6 million in economic aid alongside extensive human capital and military aid, providing ground troops in coalition with the Defense Treaty (1953). This military support was meant to be a measure post-war to allow for economic development and was initially framed as a stabilization-oriented measure, but it transformed into a pivotal mechanism of deterrence to North Korea. The alliance came to be understood as a symbol of the U.S. broader commitment to maintaining balance as well as to stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Over time, the U.S.-South Korea alliance and its attempts to negotiate with North Korea weren’t always successful, with fluctuations between periods of hostility and cautious cooperation. One of the first successful diplomatic moves towards North Korea was the Sunshine Policy era in the early 2000s, where the two presidents, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il, met for the first time in a summit. This era faced criticisms as it seemed that the U.S. and South Korea did not properly address the development of nuclear powers during this period, and could have even aided it. This alliance serves as a meaningful actor because of its close proximity to South Korea, where the U.S. can act and be close if the situation escalates and if necessary. The current relationship between North and South Korea is still developing. The reason why this is such an important aspect of the U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea is that it still needs to maintain its relationship with South Korea while moving forward and acting as a united front. If not, North Korea may move forward and not see conceivable threats coming from that region, and even make hostile moves towards South Korea.
North Korea has been under a dictatorial regime since it was first established in 1948, passing down its lineage through three dictators. Their dictatorship, paired with their nuclear power, suggests there is no near end in sight, making it essential that every move made towards them has to be intentional and calculated. There is utmost importance in making steps that they are able to retract in case conditions are not met. With reference to Frank Lavin’s piece, political director under Ronald Reagan, “Ten Simple Rules for Negotiating with Dictators” which was written during President Trump’s first term in office, he unpacks the dangers of dealing with North Korea. There is little to no space to interfere in the family-governed dictatorship, leaving them with no angle to engage with North Korea unless they agree to cooperate. If they decide to keep to themselves, there is no feasible manner to impose enforceable policies. As Frank Lavin mentions, “sometimes no movement might be the best answer.” It is clear that most U.S. presidents have failed to reach amicable terms or agreements with North Korea, given that neither regime wants to change. Just recently, on 22 September 2025, Kim Jong Un came out with a statement to his parliament, saying, “If the US drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the US.” This statement underscores the regimes and the lineage of dictators that stand in its non-negotiable position of denuclearization. With no effective U.S. channels to impose pressure without fear of nuclear threats on South Korea, or the severance of contact completely means the U.S. is in no position to oppose Kim Jong Un’s statement. A drastic measure would put the United States in an irreversible stance that will greatly impact how it can move forward if given the opportunity. Kim is evidently setting the standard and dictating the entry point, positioning North Korea in a powerful stance. This is a clear example of how many professionals and policymakers will advocate for less engagement without clear conditions with North Korea, as they risk legitimizing the regime.
On top of their dictatorial structure and nuclear arms, North Korea may pose another threat in terms of global economic development and deeper involvement with China and Russia. The capital of North Korea, Pyongyang, and its ties with Moscow intensified after the signing of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in 2024, where both countries agreed to the Russian supply of energy, military and technology, as well as infrastructure into North Korea. Additionally, Kim’s visit to Beijing alongside Chinese and Russian leaders in September 2025 symbolizes his debut on the multilateral diplomatic stage (Lee, 2025). These moves pose a more complex issue as North Korea is no longer acting unilaterally and now has concrete foreign support to rely on. By strengthening these economic ties, as seen in North Korea-China trade, which increased 26.8% year-on-year in May to $230 million, it may stop fearing sanctions that once threatened their regime. This growing interdependence and cooperation leave the U.S. with a harder angle to approach North Korea, not only geopolitically but also with fewer allies to impose meaningful isolation on the state.
Given what the experts say about deterrence or low-involvement policies, there are a plethora of questions to consider. These include questioning if there are other angles that have been suggested and need to be evaluated with all of these factors considered and mentioned above, and whether there are any means that the U.S. can progress without sacrificing driving motivations and resources.