Kazakhstan can keep NVIDIA’s chips coming to Ekibastuz without dropping Moscow or Beijing.
October 23 marked the first visit of Jensen Huang to Kazakhstan, when he gave a speech in Astana alongside Deputy Prime Minister Zhaslan Madiyev, whose plan behind the stage is tens of thousands of NVIDIA chips for the Data Center Valley in Ekibastuz. According to Madiyev, Washington has already approved around 45,000 GB300s for Kazakhstan, though the license itself was not made public.
Back in June, the government signed $10 billion in planned agreements for the valley with Firebird, an American company that specializes in constructing AI data centers, and Kazakhtelecom, the state telecom that will provide the pipes. The first 50 megawatts are expected to go online in June 2027, gradually reaching a gigawatt mark. That is quite a heavy load for a country that faced a shortfall of 1.5 billion kWh in 2025.
Whether the chips ship at all, though, comes down to politics. On October 19 in Samarkand, Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that the United States seeks “fair competition and an opportunity” and does not ask anyone to “stop working with some other country.” An undated State Department draft letter, reported by Reuters, puts it very differently: joining a rival AI alliance may get a country excluded from the American one, because “to be part of everything is to be part of nothing.” Kazakhstan joined Pax Silica, the U.S.-led AI supply-chain pact, in June, and in July became a founding member of WAICO, China’s rival AI cooperation organization. Making it the only country to belong to both.
It is clear why Astana hedged. Choosing a side is costly. The nuclear power plants Kazakhstan needs to close its power gap are being built by Russia’s Rosatom and China’s CNNC, so cutting off Moscow and Beijing means cutting off the long-term electricity a gigawatt campus depends on. Washington has good reasons to keep the relationship, too: Pax Silica is about minerals as well, and Kazakhstan has tungsten and rare earths that America would rather not buy from China.
There is also a precedent for a middle path. When Washington has applied pressure in the past, it has targeted what sits inside the data center, not a country’s wider alliances. In 2024, the UAE’s G42 removed Huawei equipment from its systems as part of its deal with Microsoft, and that was enough. Astana doesn’t have to pick a side. It has to prove the chips stay clean.
So the most valuable asset for Kazakhstan to sell is proof. A campus firewall means tough, checkable rules that apply to the Ekibastuz site only. Firebird must comply with American export rules and knows its customers, and what it cannot do on Kazakh soil is prove it to anybody, and this is where the government comes into play. Giving third-party auditors a legal right to examine the site and read the records means making the proof checkable.
There is a working model in the country. Since September, the 496 chips in the national supercomputer of Kazakhstan are governed by rules banning weaponization and secret monitoring of people, and these rules can govern every tenant in Ekibastuz, with a new power to suspend a tenant immediately. Kazakhtelecom must also isolate the network controlling the chips from its systems and leave it accessible for third-party audits, while the customer data remains encrypted when leaving the campus through the regular lines of the country.
The grid gives both sides a timeline anyway. The first 50 megawatts fit into the spare power projected by the Energy Ministry in 2027. A full gigawatt requires many times that power, so the campus will most likely grow in stages regardless of any plan. Washington will not approve every stage in advance, but before June 2027 it can agree on the audit rules in writing and set the deadlines for deciding on every new stage.
The most convincing objection is that no audit can catch a middleman with a clean-looking appearance renting time to a blacklisted firm. Fair enough. Rules do not have to catch everything. They have to make it easy and expensive to get caught, requiring every tenant to disclose its true owner and allowing regulators to suspend the tenant immediately. Washington has already accepted this risk next door, approving Firebird’s NVIDIA chips for Armenia, which belongs to the same Russian-led economic union as Kazakhstan.
According to Rubio, America wants fair competition. A country that can prove where every chip is and who is plugged into it competes under these conditions, and this keeps the Russians and the Chinese outside the fence, building the reactors that provide the power. When Madiyev meets with Huang, the request should be simple: help make this case at Commerce, where 65,000 of NVIDIA’s own chips are waiting for approval.

